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THE POWER OF ONE: EFFECTS OF CEO DUALITY ON COMPENSATION COMMITTEE QUALITY
AND CEO COMPENSATION
Cindy K. Harris, Ursinus College
Carol C. Cirka, Ursinus College
Eric Farris, KPMG
ABSTRACT
This paper contributes to the corporate governance literature by focusing on how Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”)
duality and compensation committee quality are related to CEO compensation in the period since passage of the
Sarbanes Oxley Act (“SOX”). Unlike research prior to SOX that focused chiefly on committee members’
independence, we measure compensation committee quality in two ways. We consider the average number of board
directorships held by compensation committee members as well as the proportion of committee members with prior
or current CEO duality experience. We introduce the latter variable as a new measure of quality as it has not been
utilized in research conducted prior to or since the passage of SOX. Using a sample of 100 2007 Fortune 500 firms,
we find that CEO duality does not have a significant effect on CEO compensation. However, we document a
positive relationship between average number of directorships and CEO compensation and also find evidence that
CEO duality moderates the relationship between our measures of compensation committee quality and CEO
compensation.
compensation committee must be composed entirely
of independent board directors.
INTRODUCTION
Shareholders expect boards of directors (“boards”) to
protect their interests by insuring that management is
accountable for their decisions and actions. In short,
boards act to reduce or eliminate the principal-agent
problem through a variety of mechanisms and
processes collectively described as corporate
governance – they provide oversight, advice and
counsel to the chief executive officer (“CEO”),
monitor management’s actions and if necessary
discipline the CEO (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003, p.
101). This board function sounds simpler than it is
since in reality corporate governance is a “complex
web of multiple interactions and relationships among
multiple actors in and around the firm” (van Ees,
Gabrielsson, & Huse, 2005, p. 5).
Evidence that existing corporate governance
structures were flawed emerged during the 1990s,
leading to calls for change. This public outrage over
corporate fraud led to passage of the Public Company
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of
2002 (SOX) or “Sarbanes-Oxley” (United States
Congress, 2002). Legislative changes mandated by
SOX and subsequent regulations issued by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
required stricter corporate governance rules designed
to increase the quality of oversight by boards of
directors. In particular, the SEC regulations affect the
composition and responsibilities of the board’s
compensation committee with its most significant
provision mandating that publicly traded firms may
not have any “insiders” on the committee; rather, the

The capacity of a board to monitor management
effectively depends on the distribution of power
between the board and its CEO (Finkelstein &
Hambrick, 2010). An important indicator of CEO
power over a board is CEO duality (Baliga & Moyer,
1996; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996), a term used to
describe a “combined” leadership structure where the
same individual holds both the position of board
chair and CEO. This contrasts with a “split”
leadership structure where the CEO and board chair
positions are held by two individuals (Schooley,
Renner, & Allen, 2010). Although the intent of SOX
was to enhance board oversight as a means to restore
investor confidence, the law does not establish any
restriction on a CEO also serving as board chair. .
The absence of a mandate by SOX to separate the
leadership structure raises the question as to whether
the presence of CEO duality may undermine the
capacity of a board or its compensation committee to
carry out its role independently.
A large and rich body of research investigates how
CEO duality and board independence impact firmlevel outcomes such as financial performance (e.g.,
Baliga & Moyer, 1996; Iyengar & Zampeli, 2009;
Lam & Lee, 2008) and individual-level outcomes
such as CEO compensation (Core, Holthausen, &
Larcker, 1999; Dorata & Petra, 2008; Fosberg, 1999;
Sapp, 2008). Mixed findings from these studies
prevent clear conclusions as to whether CEO duality
is associated with higher levels of compensation.
What is clear is that CEOs continue to receive
lucrative, some would argue excessive, compensation

and despite calls to separate the two positions and a
substantial number of studies on the consequences of
CEO duality, many firms continue to be led by
individuals who hold both the CEO and chair
positions. In the US, CEO duality continues to be the
dominant board leadership structure (Chhaochharia &
Grinstein, 2007; Lam & Lee, 2008) with about 70%
of the largest public US firms being led by dual
CEOs for the past 20 years (Giove, Connolly, &
Lilienfeld, 2011).
Research that investigates the effect of compensation
committee quality on CEO compensation typically
relies on data from the pre-SOX period and generally
examines the effect of compensation committee
independence on executive compensation. (Newman
& Mozes, 1999) With the passage of SOX, however,
boards and compensation committees must comply
with the legislated mandate of director independence,
effectively eliminating it as a meaningful measure of
board or committee quality. Scholars have begun to
examine compensation committee quality using
variables other than independence (Sapp, 2008; Sun
& Cahan, 2009). Further, recent studies measure the
composition and quality of the committee and their
effects on CEO compensation directly or in
combination with firm performance (e.g., Conyon &
Peck, 1998).
Little research examines the
relationship among these three critical corporate
governance variables: CEO duality, compensation
committee quality and CEO compensation. In fact,
we found the relationship between CEO duality and
CEO compensation to be a primary focus in only nine
studies prior to the passage of SOX. Research that
examines corporate governance in the post-SOX era
is just now emerging (e.g., Petra & Dorata, 2008;
Sapp, 2008; Switzer & Tang, 2009; Huang, Lai,
McNamara, & Wang, 2011; Valenti, 2008). We
identified only four published empirical studies that
examine the relationship between CEO duality and
CEO compensation and only two of those studies use
exclusively post-SOX data.
This paper contributes to the corporate governance
literature by focusing on how CEO duality and
compensation committee quality are related to CEO
compensation in the post-SOX period. In particular,
we build on the work of Sun and colleagues (2009) to
investigate the role that average directorships plays in
affecting committee quality and determining CEO
compensation. We extend their work by introducing
a new measure of committee quality, the proportion
of CEO directors on the committee who have prior or
current CEO duality experience themselves. First, we
examine the impact of corporate governance
measures of quality on CEO compensation using

post-SOX data. Second, we specifically focus on the
quality characteristics of the compensation
committee, rather than the corporate board as a
whole. Third, we examine CEO duality as a
moderator of the relationship between compensation
committee quality and CEO compensation.
We organize this paper as follows. We explain our
choice of agency theory as the primary conceptual
framework to guide our analysis. Next, we briefly
review the role of the compensation committee and
describe the changes that resulted from SOX as they
apply to the committee. We clarify the terminology
surrounding “independence” and “quality” as well as
CEO duality. We then review the relevant literature
on the relationships among CEO duality, CEO
compensation and compensation committee quality,
present our theoretical model and hypotheses, and
describe our research design and findings. We
conclude by discussing the implications of our
findings for practice and future research and
acknowledge our study’s limitations.
BACKGROUND
Conceptual Framework
Research on corporate governance relies largely on
agency theory although a visible subset of work (e.g.
Anderson, Melanson, & Maly, 2007; Boivie, Lange,
McDonald, & Westphal, 2011; Davis et al., 1997;
Donaldson, 1990) relies on alternative frameworks
such as stewardship theory and resource dependence
theory. In practice, however, an agency perspective
has driven recent legislation such as SOX (Kaufman
& Englander, 2005) and corporate governance
research is often premised on the assumption that
there is an agency problem in corporate control. In
other words, because the interests of shareholders and
the CEO diverge and CEOs hold positions of power,
they are motivated to make decisions and act in ways
that advance their personal goals
(Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). The role of the board is to
constrain this self-serving behavior by governing the
relationship between the principal (shareholders) and
its agent (management) (Erakovic & Overall, 2010)
through strong, knowledgeable and independent
directors (Bennington, 2010). Therefore, consistent
with current thinking, we use agency theory to guide
this study.
CEO Duality
The chair of the board has the responsibility to ensure
the company is following bylaws and policies
established by the organization, develop agendas for
board meetings, and guide the board effectively in

overseeing management. As the highest ranking
manager, the CEO is charged with decision making
related to corporate goals, strategies, risks and
integrity while collaborating with other top
executives. When there is CEO duality, a single
individual is accountable for completion of both sets
of duties. A CEO who is also chair is potentially less
objective since s/he is not only responsible to pursue
management’s goals but also to oversee and evaluate
CEO effectiveness.
While there is good reason for the persistent debate
about the desirability of CEO duality, agency theory
suggests that the costs of this leadership structure
outweigh its benefits. From an agency perspective,
CEO duality represents less board control over
management and is therefore inappropriate since it
restricts the monitoring role of the board, leads to
greater inherent risk
(Dickins, 2010), CEO
entrenchment (Kim, Al-Shammari, Kim, & Lee,
2009; Pfeffer, 1981), increased information
asymmetry (Kim et al., 2009) and lower firm
performance. But, without CEO duality, it is more
difficult to assign responsibility for [the firm’s] poor
performance, increases the costs of information
sharing, and limits the CEO’s authority to make
critical decisions and move rapidly to enhance
shareholder returns.
Opponents of CEO duality
believe it may enable the CEO to achieve an elevated
position of power and argue that it leads to CEO
entrenchment, which “occurs when managers gain so
much power that they are able to use the firm to
further their own interests rather than the interests of
shareholders”
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003)..
Advocates of CEO duality cite the value added as a
result of a single, unified leadership position and
argue that adequate independent oversight of
management can be achieved through other
appropriate board mechanisms, measures and
activities.

making recommendations to the Board on
stockholder
proposals
related
to
compensation matters, and administering the
employee stock purchase plan”
(Intel,
2010).
Most researchers agree that the compensation
committee plays a crucial role in setting both the
amount and mix of CEO pay (Barkema & GomezMejia, 1998). The overarching goal is for a quality
committee to carry out its monitoring responsibilities
objectively to insure that “executive compensation
packages are designed to align the incentives of
executives and a firm’s stakeholders” (Sapp, 2008, p.
711). In reality, the “CEO and the Board frequently
have relationships with one another allowing the
potential for inter-personal relationships and other
factors to influence the executive compensation
process” (Sapp, 2008, p. 717).
High quality governance can effectively offset the
agency problem if the board is independent. As Fama
and Jensen argued in their seminal paper (1983), the
function of monitoring management and settling
decision disputes is performed best by directors who
are independent from management and who are
decision experts (Mace, 1986) including insiders
who have knowledge and expertise of the
corporation’s activities (Schooley et al., 2010). SOX
requires increased board independence to provide
more protection for shareholders, a mandate that
reflects an agency perspective (Schooley et al.,
2010).
Included in these regulations is the
requirement that the compensation committee may
not have any “insiders”; rather, the committee must
be composed entirely of independent board directors.
This change is noteworthy because it impacts the
actual composition of compensation committees as
well as scholarship that examines how compensation
committee characteristics are related to CEO
compensation.

Quality of Compensation Committees
Companies may have different names for the
committee but its fiduciary role is essentially the
same regardless of its title. Deloitte (2009) describes
the practice of the compensation committee as “…to
set appropriate and supportable pay programs that are
in the organization’s best interests and aligned with
its business mission and strategy…” Further, as
stated in the 2010 Intel proxy, the committee also:
“reviews and determines various other
compensation
policies
and
matters,
including making recommendations to the
Board and to management related to
employee compensation and benefit plans,

Studies that investigate compensation committee
quality using measures other than independence and
that use post –SOX data are few. (Sapp, 2008) Sapp’s
(2008) work is notable because although his data are
taken from both the pre-SOX and post-SOX periods,
he moved beyond independence to assess
compensation committee quality and examine
corporate governance variables in relation to total
executive compensation packages. He found that an
increase in the percentage of current CEOs on the
compensation committee is associated with an
increase in CEO compensation. Sapp asserts this
stems from the condition of “an increase in the
closeness of the compensation committee to the CEO

(more CEOs on the compensation committee means
the Board is more likely to relate to the concerns of
the CEO and thus may be willing to pay the CEO
more...”) (741). Using pre-SOX data from US firms
in 2001, Sun and Cahan (2009) studied committee
quality using compensation committee size and
individual committee member characteristics in
relation to executive pay. Their measurement of
member characteristics included years of board
experience both with the company and on other
boards, corporate ownership, and whether appointed
by the CEO, Their results show that CEO cash
compensation is more positively associated with
accounting earnings when firms have high
compensation committee quality. In sum, despite the
fact that ten years have elapsed since the passage of
SOX and its mandate for an independent
compensation committee, relationships among CEO
duality, compensation committee quality and CEO
compensation remains understudied.
THEORETICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
Based on prior research and the argument posited by
agency theory, we propose the following theoretical
model of the relationships among CEO duality,
compensation committee quality and CEO
compensation:
CEO Compensation = f (CEO duality, Compensation
Committee Quality, Compensation Committee
Meetings, Compensation Committee Size, Financial
Performance, Industry)
Diagram 1 provides a visual aid of the relationships
we are testing. See Diagram 1 in the appendix.
Given the conflicting perspectives on the desirability
of CEO duality, we examine its effect on
compensation in the post-SOX period. Consistent
with agency theory, we hypothesize it is positively
associated with CEO cash compensation. When there
is CEO duality, the CEO’s compensation is more
likely to reflect not only accounting performance and
stock returns but also the effect of the CEO’s
influence on the compensation committee through his
or her combined and entrenched role in the company.
H1: CEO duality is positively associated with CEO
cash compensation.
Research conducted prior to the enactment of SOX
frequently used independence as a measure of
compensation committee quality and results were
mixed (e.g., Anderson & Bizjak, 2003; Newman &
Mozes, 1999; Vafeas, 2003). Calls in the post-SOX
period to identify “…a broader and richer set of
variables related to the structure and composition of

the compensation committee” (Sun & Cahan, 2009,
p. 193) have increased given the legislative and
regulatory mandate aimed at increasing committee
quality by requiring all members to be independent.
Findings from studies that examine variables other
than independence suggest that higher quality
oversight by the compensation committee depends on
members’ available time, experience and expertise
(e.g., Petra & Dorata, 2008; Sun & Cahan, 2009; Sun,
Cahan, & Emanuel, 2009). Directors on one firm’s
compensation committee who also hold directorships
with other companies are likely to be very busy. To
the extent that multiple compensation committee
members hold other directorships they will have less
time to fulfill their oversight function and in turn
committee quality will be reduced. Compared to the
robust literature on the effects of independence on
boards, less is known about the consequences for
corporate governance when board members are busy
due to outside commitments. There is some evidence
to suggest that busy directors shirk responsibilities
leading to weaker corporate governance in the form
of lower committee quality and higher CEO cash
compensation (Core et al., 1999; Fich & Shivdasani,
2006; Larcker, Richardson, & Tuna, 2007; Sun &
Cahan, 2009; Sun et al., 2009). In contrast, Ferris and
colleagues (2003) do not find any evidence that busy
directors shirk their responsibilities.
Another notable determining indicator of committee
quality would be members’ experience and expertise
on the subject of executive compensation. Holding
multiple directorships could give directors
opportunities to increase their expertise as well as
greater incentive to effectively monitor since their
reputation as a decision expert is on the line ( Fama
& Jensen, 1983; Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999).
Agency theory suggests that too many directorships,
the “busy board member hypothesis,” will lower
directors’ effectiveness as monitors. Some research
finds support for this argument (e.g., Fich &
Shivdasani, 2006); however, findings are not
consistent (e.g., Klein, 1998; Weir, Laing, &
McKnight, 2002). In a study that explicitly focuses
on the number of directorships and CEO
compensation, Sun and colleagues (2009) found that
a larger average number of directorships leads to
lower CEO compensation. While a certain amount of
expertise and prestige is derived from multiple
directorships, the loss of time and commitment that
can accompany numerous appointments can cancel
out the benefits. It is possible that busy directors can
enhance committee quality; however, the stronger
argument in our view is that when committee

members hold multiple directorships the committee’s
quality is reduced.
H2a: The average number of directorships held by
compensation committee members is positively
associated with CEO cash compensation, indicating
lower compensation committee quality.
When compensation committee members also hold
the position of CEO in their own firms, their business
leadership experience and expertise can enhance
governance quality. Carpenter & Westphal (2001)
argue that directors who have prior rather than
concurrent CEO experience at other firms are able to
better evaluate potential CEOs. Similarly, when more
members of the compensation committee have CEO
experience, the quality of oversight carried out in
granting CEO compensation may be enhanced
because the compensation committee is of higher
quality. The impact of higher quality corporate
governance is that the CEO’s compensation may be
more closely associated with accounting and stock
return measures of the firm than in a situation with
lower committee quality. Further, when these CEO
committee members also have prior or current CEO
duality experience, their objective and independent
oversight role may be further strengthened,
enhancing the quality of the compensation
committee.
As a homogeneous and cohesive collection of
individuals (Useem, 1984), when CEOs of other
firms sit on a board’s compensation committee, some
posit that they may identify and empathize with the
firm’s CEO resulting in more support for favorable
pay decisions and lower governance quality (Daily et
al., 1998; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Sun & Cahan,
2009; Sun et al., 2009). Fahlenbrach et al. (2008)
failed to find evidence for what they term the “buddy
hypothesis” in their study of CEOs who sit on boards;
however, as Sun et al. (2009) point out, there is
virtually no work that examines specifically the
effects of members of the compensation committee
who are also CEOs. A strong case can be made that
compensation committee members who themselves
have CEO experience might be more effective
members because of their expertise and reputation
(Sun et al., 2009). Taking it one step further, when a
compensation committee has a larger proportion of
members with prior or current CEO experience in
which they also had CEO duality, the experience and
expertise of those members enhances committee
quality.
H2b: The proportion of compensation committee
members who have prior or current CEO duality

experience is negatively associated with CEO cash
compensation, indicating higher compensation
committee quality.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b test whether attributes of
compensation committee quality affect CEO
compensation. However, we expect CEO duality to
moderate the strength of both of these relationships.
The interactive effect of the average number of
directorships of the compensation committee and
CEO duality on CEO compensation has not been
tested in prior studies. Likewise, the interactive
effective of committee members’ CEO duality
experience and CEO duality has not been examined
in prior research.
While we expect the average number of directorships
of the compensation committee to be positively
associated with CEO cash compensation (H2a), the
presence of CEO duality will weaken this positive
relationship, strengthening the quality of the
committee. In this case, compensation committee
members who serve as directors on a greater number
of boards will be affected by the presence of a dual
CEO and will act more judiciously in their
governance of the dual CEO’s compensation. Thus
we hypothesize the following:
H3a: CEO duality weakens the positive relationship
between average number of outside directorships
held by compensation committee members and CEO
cash compensation.
While we expect the proportion of compensation
committee members who have prior or current CEO
duality experience to be negatively associated with
CEO cash compensation (H2b), the presence of CEO
duality will weaken this negative relationship,
reducing the quality of the committee. In this case,
compensation committee members who have CEO
duality experience are expected to be less judicious in
their governance of CEO compensation because they
align more with the dual CEO. Given their similar
experience and perspective, the objectivity of
committee members will be compromised in setting
CEO cash compensation. Therefore we hypothesize
the following:
H3b: CEO duality weakens the negative relationship
between the proportion of compensation committee
members with prior or current CEO duality
experience and CEO cash compensation.
REGRESSION MODELS
Model 1: ln (CashSalary2008) = B0 + B1CEO duality
+ B2 Compensation Committee Quality

(CompCommitteeMemberDuality,
AverageDirectorships) + B3Compensation
Committee Meetings + B4Compensation Committee
Size + B5Financial Performance (ROE %, Sales
(log)) + B6Industry
Model 2: ln (CashSalary2008) = B0 + B1CEO duality
+ B2 Compensation Committee Quality
(CompCommitteeMemberDuality,
AverageDirectorships) + B3Compensation
Committee Meetings + B4Compensation Committee
Size + B5Financial Performance (ROE %, Sales
(log)) + B6Industry +
B7CEOduality*CompCommitteeMemberDuality +
B8CEOduality*AverageDirectorships
METHOD

CEO Cash Compensation. CashSalary2008 is the
dependent variable and captures the cash component
of CEO compensation in calendar year 2008. The log
of cash compensation is used so that the difference in
magnitude of compensation across companies is
reduced, and it is more likely the variable has a
normal distribution (Sun & Cahan, 2009). CEO cash
compensation was obtained from each company’s
2008 proxy statement. Similar to prior studies of
executive compensation, we use cash compensation
since it reflects current CEO performance rather than
future performance, thus representing the immediate
reward component of compensation (Sun & Cahan,
2009). Based on previous studies using agency theory
as the framework for executive compensation, cash
compensation helps align the interests of
stockholders and executives through monetary
incentives.

Sample Selection
Independent Variables
The data set consists of 100 randomly selected 2007
Fortune 500 Companies. Fortune 500 companies are
used because their larger executive compensation
packages have caused the recent controversy
regarding the level of CEO compensation. All 500
companies were assigned a random number. The first
100 firms with the lowest assigned random number
that met the criteria for the study were selected. In
total there were 184 exclusions out of 284 Fortune
500 companies that were examined. A summary of
the exclusions is provided in Table 1. See Table 1 in
the appendix.
Financial and public utility companies are excluded
because the regulation of those industries may mask
the efficiency differences across firms within the
industry (Vafeas, 2003). Due to the economic events
during the latter part of 2008, we include only
companies with a fiscal year end of December 31,
2007, thereby avoiding fluctuations in financial
results for firms with fiscal years ending in 2008.
Also if there was a change in CEO or CEO duality
status between 2007 and 2008, the company is
excluded from the sample. These eliminations are
made to ensure the consistency of the CEO and their
position within the firm. There are a variety of factors
included in “Miscellaneous Exclusions” such as a
mid-year change in compensation committee
composition. “Multiple Exclusions” refers to
circumstances in which a company is excluded from
the sample for more than one reason, such as being a
financial company with a fiscal year end in
September.
Dependent Variable

CEODuality represents whether or not the CEO of
the corporation is also the board chair in 2007.
CEODuality is a dummy variable where ‘1’ signifies
that CEO duality exists and ‘0’ signifies split
leadership.
This information was gathered by
examining disclosures on company websites and its
2007 and 2008 annual reports. The CEO duality
status was verified over these two years to ensure
consistency of the individual serving in that capacity
in both years.
Compensation Committee Quality. We measure the
quality of the compensation committee using two
variables: the average number of directorships held
by committee members (AverageDirectorships) and
the proportion of compensation committee members
with prior or current experience as a CEO with
duality
(CompCommitteeMemberDuality).
AverageDirectorships is determined using the
weighted average number of other board
directorships held by members of the compensation
committee in 2007. This variable is calculated by
dividing the sum of current other directorships held
by all compensation committee members by the total
number of members serving on the committee.
Information about current other directorships was
gathered from committee members’ biographies
provided in the company’s proxy statements.
CompCommitteeMemberDuality
represents
the
proportion of compensation committee members (in
2007) who either have prior or current experience
serving as both CEO and board chair of a company.
This variable is calculated by dividing the total
number of CEOs on the committee who have prior or

current CEO duality by the total number of
committee members.
Control Variables
Consistent with prior research on executive
compensation, we include control variables in our
analysis.
The variable Meetings measures the
number of compensation committee meetings held
during the calendar year 2007. This information is
reported in the company proxy statements.
CommitteeSize represents the number of directors
serving on the compensation committee in 2007 and
is also reported in proxy statements. Prior studies
examine the size of the board in relation to CEO
compensation (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber, 1999; Core
et al., 1999). Since this study examines the effect of
compensation committee quality on executive
compensation, we use the size of the compensation
committee rather than the size of the entire board.
Return on Equity (“ROE”) measures the financial
performance using the percentage return for the
calendar year 2007. Controlling for company size,
Sales represents the log of sales of the company for
the fiscal year 2007. ROE and Sales data were
obtained from the Mergent Online database. Industry
represents the company’s classification according to
the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), also
obtained from the Mergent Online database. The five
industries used are mining, manufacturing,
communication, retail and service. Each industry is
represented by a dummy variable for that industry
and the service industry is withheld from the model
for comparison purposes.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents a summary of the descriptive results
for the sample data collected. Table 3 presents a
breakdown of the sample by industry. Table 4
summarizes the correlations among the study
variables. See Tables 2, 3 and 4 in the appendix.
The average CEO cash salary in 2008 was
$1,168,191. Seventy percent of the corporate CEOs
in the sample had CEO duality, consistent with the
findings of Giove, Connolly, and Lilienfeld in 2011.
Forty-two percent of compensation committee
members had either prior or current CEO duality
experience. The average number of compensation
committee meetings was 6.46 times per year,
somewhat higher than previously documented by
Vafeas (2003). This higher meeting frequency is
likely the result of greater emphasis placed on

corporate governance since the passage of SOX. The
average compensation committee size was 4.30
members, a result that is comparable to the average
of 4.37 members found by Vafeas (2003). Each
compensation committee member in our sample held
on average just over 1.62 other board directorships. .
Model 1 Empirical Results
Table 5 presents regression results (Model 1) for
study variables excluding the interaction terms.
Table 6 includes the interaction terms in the
regression analysis. See Tables 5 and 6 in the
appendix.
Model 1 results summarized in Table 5 do not
support Hypothesis 1, as there is not a statistically
significant association between CEO duality with
CEO cash compensation (B = .138; p=.176). Thus,
whether there is split leadership or CEO duality has
no bearing on CEO cash compensation in this
sample. The results support Hypothesis 2a, since an
increase by one in the average number of
directorships (AverageDirectorships) leads to a
14.9% (B = .149; p=.008) increase in CEO cash
compensation. This rise in compensation supports the
argument that when a compensation committee
member holds more directorships, the member may
be less effective in carrying out their oversight role,
thereby resulting in lower governance quality.
Hypothesis 2b is not supported by Model 1 empirical
findings. We expected the proportion of
compensation committee members with prior or
current CEO duality experience to be negatively
associated with CEO cash compensation, indicating
higher compensation committee quality. Although
the variable CompCommitteeMemberDuality is
marginally statistically significant (p = .082), the
coefficient is positive (B=.299). An increase by 10%
in the proportion of compensation committee
members with duality is associated with an increase
in CEO compensation of 2.99%. Thus, when there
are more committee members with prior or current
CEO duality experience, it is likely that close interpersonal relationships between the CEO and those
committee members compromise the objectivity of
committee members, resulting in weaker governance
over executive compensation.
Results for control variables in Model 1 are as
follows: 1) meetings (B = .039; p = .031), 2) ROE (B
= - .004; p = .029), 3) log of sales (B = .075; p =
.102) and 4) the communication industry (B = - .483;
p = .010). Committee size and other industries did not

have significant coefficients. The R squared for
Model 1 is .363 and the Adjusted R squared is .284.
Model 2 Empirical Results
Model 2 tests Hypotheses 3a and 3b by adding two
interaction terms to Model 1. The change in
Adjusted R squared from Model 1 to Model 2 (.047)
is significant at the .05 level (F-change p = .036).
Consistent with Model 1, the effect of CEO duality
on CEO cash compensation is statistically
insignificant (B = .328, p = .144). Likewise, the
coefficient for AverageDirectorships is significant
and positive (B = .278, p < .0001) indicating that
when the average number of directorships held by
members of the compensation committee increases,
so does CEO compensation.
However, the
coefficient for CompCommitteeMemberDuality is not
statistically significant (B = -.255, p = .479) in Model
2.
Hypothesis 3a is supported. We expected that as a
moderator, CEO duality would weaken the positive
relationship between average number of directorships
held by compensation committee members and CEO
cash compensation, thereby strengthening the quality
of the committee. The coefficient of the interaction
term CEODuality*AverageDirectorships (B = -.252,
p = .022) reflects a significant and strong negative
association with CEO cash compensation. It indicates
that in the presence of CEO duality, as the average
outside directorships increases, CEO compensation
decreases. Thus, the presence of CEO duality as a
moderator strengthens the quality of the
compensation committee as hypothesized. Given
CEO duality, compensation committee members with
more directorships tend to be more judicious in their
governance of executive compensation. The net result
is that while CEO compensation increases by 27.8%
when average directorships increases by one, this
increase is reduced to only 2.6% in this sample when
there is CEO duality.
Hypothesis 3b receives marginal support. We
expected that as a moderator, CEO duality would
weaken the negative relationship between the
proportion of compensation committee members with
prior or current CEO duality experience and CEO
cash compensation. The coefficient of the interaction
term CEODuality*CompCommitteeMemberDuality
(B = .690, p = .089) reflects a marginally significant
positive association with CEO cash compensation.
This outcome suggests that the presence of CEO
duality as a moderator weakens the quality of the
compensation committee in its oversight of CEO
compensation. That is, when a higher proportion of

compensation committee members themselves have
CEO duality experience, in the presence of a
company with CEO duality, those committee
members may tend to align with the corporate dual
CEO. This alignment compromises their objectivity
in carrying out the committee’s responsibilities in
setting CEO compensation and may reflect closer
inter-personal relationships.
CONCLUSION
This study investigates the effects of CEO duality on
compensation committee quality and CEO cash
compensation in the post-SOX period. Unlike
research prior to SOX that focused chiefly on
committee members’ independence, we measure
compensation committee quality in two ways. We
consider the average number of board directorships
held by compensation committee members as well as
the proportion of committee members with prior or
current CEO duality experience. We introduce the
latter variable as a new measure of quality as it has
not been utilized in research conducted prior to or
since the passage of SOX. Further, we examine
whether CEO duality moderates the relationship
between these measures of compensation committee
quality and CEO compensation.
In establishing the requirement that all members of
the compensation committee be independent, the
intent of SOX legislation and related SEC regulations
was to improve the committee’s governance quality.
However, CEO duality was not prohibited for public
companies subject to these rules. Consistent with
agency theory, this condition could undermine the
ability of compensation committee members to act
objectively and independently in setting CEO
compensation. Their decision making may unduly
favor the dual CEO rather than represent the best
interests of stockholders by rewarding the CEO based
on the firm’s financial performance under the CEO’s
leadership.
Our findings do not support our hypothesis that CEO
duality is associated with higher levels of CEO cash
compensation. However, we present evidence that
CEO duality moderates the effects of measures of
committee quality, in both instances weakening the
impact of these measures. First, the positive
relationship between average number of directorships
held by compensation committee members and CEO
compensation is reduced in the presence of CEO
duality, suggesting CEO duality strengthens
committee quality. This outcome indicates that when
there is a dual CEO, committee members with more
directorships are inclined to make more careful

compensation package decisions in order to protect
against the tendency of the dual CEO to influence
those decisions in his or her favor. Thus, in this
situation, CEO duality is a factor that enhances
corporate governance by offsetting the tendency of
“busy” committee members with more directorships
to otherwise relax their oversight. Second, we
document a positive relationship between committee
members’ CEO duality experience and CEO
compensation. This finding is not what we expected
and suggests that the “buddy hypothesis” may
warrant further investigation.
Further, in the
presence of CEO duality, we also note this positive
association with CEO compensation is increased,
which represents a further weakening of
compensation committee quality. This outcome
indicates that when there is a dual CEO, committee
members with prior or current CEO duality
experience are inclined to relax their objective
oversight of compensation decisions, reflecting their
tendency to align with the dual CEO. Thus, CEO
duality in this circumstance is a factor that
compromises effective corporate governance by the
compensation committee, leading to higher CEO cash
compensation.
Like any study, we recognize that our research has
some limitations. First, our study uses sample data of
100 firms drawn from only the largest companies in
the United States. It is unclear whether our findings
can be applied to firms of all sizes or generalized to
firms operating in other countries. In addition, this
relatively small sample size may be one explanation
for the lack of findings in the case of CEO duality’s
influence on CEO compensation or the marginally
significant findings in the case of several other
variables, including CEO duality’s moderating
influence. Future research may explore the effect of
compensation
committee
quality on
CEO
compensation using data from firms of varying sizes
as well as from international firms. In addition, future
testing of our hypotheses on a larger sample across
multiple years may yield different results.
Another limitation is the possibility of omitted
variables that may influence CEO cash
compensation. These variables could include other
CEO characteristics besides CEO duality, other
corporate governance quality measures of the
compensation committee, and other financial
performance measures. Future research should
incorporate these additional characteristics. The use
of cash compensation is another limitation of the
study that could be overcome by including additional
components of the CEO’s compensation package
such as bonuses or equity holdings. Finally, we

combined into a single variable the compensation
committee members with prior or current CEO
duality experience. Future research may refine the
analysis by separating those committee members
with prior CEO duality experience from those
members who are currently serving as a dual CEO.
These changes to future research designs might yield
more conclusive findings.
However, this study contributes theoretically and
practically to the field of corporate governance and in
particular has implications for future research on
CEO duality, compensation committee quality and
CEO compensation. First, by utilizing post-SOX
data, our research expands the examination of
compensation committee quality beyond the narrower
pre-SOX measure of committee independence.
Second, we examine a new measure of committee
quality, which is the prior or current CEO duality
experience of compensation committee members.
Consequently, our research contributes to prior
literature built on agency theory related to the
influences on the compensation committee in setting
CEO compensation.
We find the impact of CEO duality on compensation
committee quality to be a double-edged sword. Our
results indicate that CEO duality may undermine the
capacity of the committee to carry out its role
independently, when a greater proportion of
committee members have prior or current CEO
duality experience. Given the higher CEO
compensation rewarded in this circumstance,
committee members execute less effective oversight
since those with CEO duality experience may be less
likely to oppose the firm’s dual CEO as a sign of
support of a colleague (Daily, 1998). In contrast, we
observe that CEO duality may strengthen the
committee’s quality in setting CEO compensation,
since members with multiple board directorships who
might otherwise be distracted respond to the dual
CEO by carrying out more judicious oversight in
setting CEO compensation. Thus, given the mixed
results on the effect of CEO duality on compensation
committee
quality
in
determining
CEO
compensation, our work extends the debate regarding
the desirability of CEO duality.
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APPENDIX
DIAGRAM 1
CEO DUALITY

Quality of Compensation Committee
Independent variables:
 Average number of directorships held
by committee members
 CEO duality experience of committee
members

CEO CASH
COMPENSATION

Control Variables:
 Number of committee meetings
 Committee size
 Log (Sales)
 Return on Equity (%)
 Industry

TABLE 1
Sample Selection
Reason for Exclusion

Total

Financial Companies

40

Public Utilities Companies

23

Non-Calendar Fiscal Year End

65

Change in CEO

11

Change in CEO Duality

2

Miscellaneous Exclusions

24

Multiple Exclusions

19

Total

184

TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics (N=100)
Variable

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Dependent variable:
CashSalary2008 (log)

13.88

0.49

Independent variables:
CEODuality

0.70

0.46

AverageDirectorships

1.62

0.84

CompCommitteeMemberDuality

0.42

0.28

Control Variables:
Meetings

6.46

2.49

CommitteeSize

4.30

1.01

ROE (percentage)

18.27

26.27

Sales (log)

23.08

1.06

TABLE 3
Sample Breakdown by Industry
Industry
Mining

Companies
6

Manufacturing

59

Communication

11

Retail

14

Service

10

Total

100

TABLE 4
Pearson Correlations
1
1 CashSalary2008 (log)

2 CEODuality

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1
.14

1

(.16)

3 AverageDirectorships

4 CompCommitteeMemberDuality
5 CommitteeSize

6 Meetings

7 ROE (%)

8 Sales (log)

(Significance 2-tailed at 1% level)**
(Significance 2-tailed at 5% level)*

.29**

-.14

(.00)

(.16)

.31**

.26**

.18

(.00)

(.01)

(.07)

.14

.11

-.12

.11

(.16)

(.28)

(.23)

(.26)

.18

-.07

.17

.06

-.04

(.07)

(.48)

(.09)

(.58)

(.70)

-.07

.24*

.03

.14

.05

.05

(.50)

(.02)

(.77)

(.18)

(.60)

(.59)

.25*

.17

.24*

.27**

.16

.08

.09

(.01)

(.09)

(.02)

(.01)

(.11)

(.41)

(.39)

1

1

1

1

1

1

TABLE 5
Model 1 Regression Results

R2=0.363, Adjusted R2=0.284
Coefficient

Standard
Error

TStatistic

P-value

11.255

0.994

11.319

0.000

Independent Variables:
CEODuality

0.138

0.101

1.365

0.176

AverageDirectorships

0.149

0.055

2.711

0.008

***

CompCommitteeMemberDuality

0.299

0.170

1.760

0.082

*

Control Variables:
Meetings

0.039

0.018

2.196

0.031

**

CommitteeSize

0.063

0.043

1.481

0.142

ROE (%)

-0.004

0.002

-2.220

0.029

**

Sales(log)

0.075

0.045

1.653

0.102

*

Mining

0.331

0.222

1.495

0.139

Manufacturing

0.044

0.153

0.870

0.775

Communication

-0.483

0.184

-2.623

0.010

Retail

-0.043

0.180

-0.390

0.812

Intercept

Significance
***

***

TABLE 6
Model 2 Regression Results

Intercept

R2=0.410, Adjusted R2=0.321
Coefficient

Standard
Error

TStatistic

P-value

Significance

11.058

1.000

11.059

0.000

Independent Variables:
CEODuality

***

0.328

0.222

1.476

0.144

AverageDirectorships

0.278

0.073

3.800

0.000

CompCommitteeMemberDuality

-0.255

0.359

-0.710

0.479

Interaction Terms:
CEODuality*AverageDirectorships

-0.252

0.108

-2.326

0.022

**

CEODuality*CompCommitteeMemberDuality

0.690

0.401

1.721

0.089

*

Control Variables:
Meetings

0.034

0.017

1.949

0.055

**

CommitteeSize

0.064

0.043

1.475

0.144

ROE (%)

-0.004

0.002

-2.624

0.010

***

Sales(log)

0.083

0.045

1.857

0.067

*

Mining

0.293

0.217

1.346

0.182

Manufacturing

0.020

0.149

0.134

0.894

Communication

-0.559

0.182

-3.077

0.003

Retail

-0.066

0.176

-0.376

0.708

***

***

***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level

